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Abstract
The Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council of India has a non-conventional weighted
voting procedure having a primary player who is a blocker and a set of secondary
players. The voting weights are not fixed and are determined based on the subset of
players which participate in the voting. We introduce the notion of voting schema
to formally model such a voting procedure. Individual voting games arise from a
voting schema depending on the subset of secondary players who participate in the
voting. We make a detailed formal study of the trade-off between the minimal sizes
of winning and blocking coalitions in the voting games that can arise from a voting
schema. Finally, the GST voting procedure is assessed using the theoretical results
leading to suggestions for improvement.
Keywords Goods and Services Tax (GST) · GST Council · Voting schema ·
Weighted majority voting games · Winning and blocking coalition · Blocking power
JEL Classification C7 · D7 · H1 · H2 · H7
1 Introduction
Taxation policy is a crucial factor in determining the overall health of the economy of
a nation and the well being of its citizens. Determining taxation policy is a political
process. India is a multi-party democracy with a federal structure consisting of a
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Achieving a stable taxation policy requires the participation of the relevant political
parties governing the Centre and the States.
On 1st July 2017, a landmark taxation law came into effect in India through the
implementation of the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016
which replaced the multitude of existing taxes by a single Goods and Services Tax
(GST).1 The new act inserts Article 279A into the Constitution of India. This Article
requires the creation of a constitutional body called the GST Council. Among other
things, Article 279A specifies the decision making mechanism to be followed in the
GST Council.
Voting procedure in the GST council Clause 9 of Article 279A specifies the follow-
ing.
“Every decision of the Goods and Services Tax Council shall be taken at a
meeting, by a majority of not less than three-fourths of the weighted votes of
the members present and voting, in accordance with the following principles,
namely:
(a) the vote of the Central Government shall have a weightage of one-third of
the total votes cast, and
(b) the votes of all the State Governments taken together shall have a weightage
of two-thirds of the total votes cast, in that meeting.”
From the above, it becomes clear that the voting procedure in the GST Council is a
weighted voting mechanism. The purpose of this work is to analyse the GST voting
rules using the formal framework of voting games.
There is a rich and several decades old literature on voting games. The notion of
voting power of a player was proposed by Penrose (1946) and later by Banzhaf (1965).
Shapley (1953) and Shapley and Shubik (1954) studied voting in the framework where
the order in which votes are cast is important. There has been a great deal of work
on formal analysis of voting games. We refer the reader to Felsenthal and Machover
(1998) and Laruelle and Valenciano (2011) for details and the surveys (Napel 2016;
Kurz et al. 2015) for discussions on the various topics in the area. A textbook level
introduction to the area can be found in Chakravarty et al. (2015).
Most of the literature on voting games has studied the setting where each player
has two options (to vote ‘yes’, or to vote ‘no’) and the outcome is binary. Laruelle and
Valenciano (2012) studied the setting where each player has four choices, namely to
vote ‘yes’, to vote ’no’, to abstain, or to be absent and the outcome is still binary. The
more general framework where the players have multiple options and and there could
also be more than two outcomes has been analysed by Freixas and Zwicker (2003)
and Freixas and Zwicker (2009).
Use of weighted voting for taking decision is employed in various public bodies.
Two of the most important examples are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the European Union (EU). Analysis of the voting procedures in these bodies using
the formalism of voting games have been reported in the literature (Leech 2002a, b).
1 http://gstcouncil.gov.in/sites/default/files/consti-amend-act.pdf.
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Other examples include elections in the Senate of US, and in the parliaments of several
European countries.
The voting rules of the GST Council do not specify a single voting game. Since the
number ofmembers “present and voting” can vary, a number of voting games can arise.
Further, the voting weights of the members are not fixed. Rather, it is only mentioned
that “the vote of the Central Government shall have a weightage of one-third of the
total votes cast”. The rules do not specify how the rest two-third of the total voting
weight are to be distributed among other members. However, a resolution can not pass
without the Centre. So, every voting game includes at least one player - the Centre.
We introduce a new notion, which we call voting schema, to formally model the
voting rules in the GST Council. In a voting schema, there is a primary player and a set
of secondary players. The primary player represents the Centre, while the secondary
players represent the States. In a particular meeting, a set of secondary players may
be present and voting. So, a voting schema gives rise to a number of voting games,
one for each set of secondary players who participate in the voting.
We assume that the secondary players have some a priori weights. Depending on
the actual set of players who participate in the voting, the voting weights need to be
determined. The primary player will obtain a fraction λ of the total voting weight
while the other (1 − λ) fraction of the voting weight will be distributed among the
secondary players “present and voting” in proportion in proportion to their a priori
weights. A method for obtaining such voting weights is described and proved to be
essentially unique.
We make a detailed formal study of voting games arising from voting schemas
of the above type. The primary player’s voting weight is such that it can block any
resolution, but, will need the support of some secondary players to pass a resolution.
A set of secondary players, on the other hand, cannot pass a resolution without the
primary player, but may be able to block a resolution. This tension between the pri-
mary player’s ability to pass a resolution and a group of secondary players’ ability
to block a resolution is formally modelled as (α, β)-efficiency of the game, where α
is the minimum number of secondary players required by the primary player to pass
a resolution and β is the minimum number of secondary players required to block a
resolution.
Games arising from the condition that the a priori weights of the secondary players
are equal are called uniform games.We prove that the values of α and β are maximised
if the game is uniform. Further, in a uniform game, if n players participate in the voting,
then α + β = n + 1. The combination of these two results show that for any game
which is (α, β)-efficient, the condition α + β ≤ n + 1 must hold.
We argue that the weight of the primary player should be such that it is a blocker,
but no more. To achieve this, we consider games with modified winning condition
(in short, modified games), where the winning condition is changed from “≥” to
“>”, and where the winning threshold q equals 1 − λ. Analogues of the results on
(α, β)-efficiency mentioned above are stated for modified games.
The final section transfers the theoretical results back to the context of GST voting
rules. A set of four desiderata are derived, namely, the Center should be a blocker,
its weight should be sufficient to ensure it is a blocker and no more, the weight of
any State should be less than that of the Centre, and the Centre’s task of mustering
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a passing coalition should be at least as difficult as the task of a group of States to
block a resolution moved by the Centre. It is shown that the present voting rules in
the GST Council satisfy the first and the fourth desiderata, but not the second and the
third desiderata. We propose some modifications to the GST voting rules such that all
the four desiderata are satisfied. The rules arising from the suggested modifications
are quite close to the present GST voting rules and can be easily incorporated into the
GST Act.
2 Background on voting games
The following notation will be used.
– The cardinality of a finite set S will be denoted by #S.
– For a real number x , x will denote the greatest integer not greater than x and
x will denote the least integer not lesser than x .
– The greatest common divisor of the integers a1, . . . , an will be denoted by
gcd(a1, . . . , an).
We provide some standard definitions arising in the context of voting games. For
details the reader may consult (Felsenthal and Machover 1998; Chakravarty et al.
2015).
Let N = {A1, A2, . . . , An} be a set of n players. A subset of N is called a voting
coalition. The set of all voting coalitions is denoted by 2N . A voting game G is given
by its characteristic function χG : 2N → {0, 1} where a winning coalition is assigned
the value 1 and a losing coalition is assigned the value 0. For a voting game G, the set
of all winning coalitions will be denoted by W (G) and the set of all losing coalitions
will be denoted by L(G). Below we recall some basic notions about voting games.
1. A voting game G is said to be monotone if whenever S is a winning coalition
which is contained in a coalition T , then T is also a winning coalition.
2. A voting game G is said to be proper if for any coalition S ⊆ N , χG(S) = 1
implies that χG(N \ S) = 0. In other words, in a proper game it is not allowed for
both S and its complement to be winning.
3. A coalition S ⊆ N is called a minimal winning coalition if χG(S) = 1 and there
is no T ⊂ S for which χG(T ) = 1.
4. A player Ai is said to be the dictator in G, if {Ai } is the only minimal winning
coalition in G.
5. A coalition S ⊆ N is called a blocking coalition if χG(N \ S) = 0. If Ai is a
player such that {Ai } is a blocking coalition, then Ai is said to be a blocker.
6. A blocking coalition S is said to be aminimal blocking coalition if for any Ai ∈ S,
S \ {Ai } is not a blocking coalition. In other words, if any player is dropped from
S, then S no longer remains a blocking coalition.
Definition 1 (Weighted majority voting game) Consider a triplet (N , w, q), where
N = {A1, . . . , An} is a set of players; w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) is a vector of non-
negative weights with wi being the weight of Ai ; and q is a real number in (0, 1).
Let ω = ∑ni=1 wi . The triplet (N , w, q) defines a weighted majority voting game G
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given by its characteristic function χG : 2N → {0, 1} in the following manner. Let
wS = ∑Ai∈S wi denote the sum of the weights of all the players in the coalition
S ⊆ N . Then
χG(S) =
{
1 if wS/ω ≥ q,
0 otherwise.
(1)
We will write G = (N , w, q) to denote the weighted majority voting game arising
from the triplet (N , w, q). The quantity q is called the winning threshold.
Suppose, we have a triplet (N , w, q) as in Definition 1, but, the winning condition
in (1) is changed from “≥” to “>”. This also gives rise to a voting game. By G̃ =
(N , w, q), we denote the voting game whose characteristic function is the following.
χG̃(S) =
{
1 if wS/ω > q,
0 otherwise.
(2)
The game G̃ = (N , w, q) will be called a modified weighted majority voting game
(or, simply a modified game).
2.1 Efficiency of a gamewith respect to a blocker
Suppose a gamehas at least one blocker andfixone such blocker. The blocker can block
the passing of any resolution, but, need not be able to ensure by itself that a resolution
passes. So, for passing a resolution, a blocker would require support of other players.
On the other hand, it is also of interest to know which other coalitions not containing
the blocker can prevent a resolution from being passed. These considerations motivate
us to define the following notion.
Definition 2 Suppose G is a voting game on a set of players N = {A0, A1, . . . , An}
and let A0 be a blocker. The game G is said to be (α, β)-efficient with respect to A0
if the following two conditions hold.
– Any minimal winning coalition containing A0 contains at least α players other
than A0.
– Any minimal blocking coalition not containing A0 contains at least β players.
3 Voting schema
TheGST voting procedure essentially gives rise to a voting schema rather than a single
voting game. There is a set of players corresponding to the members of the council
and various games arise depending upon the players that are “present and voting”. We
formalise the notion of voting schema below.
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Definition 3 Avoting schemaS is a tuple (m, v, q, λ, τ ), wherem is a positive integer,
v = (v1, . . . , vm) is a set of non-negative integers, q ∈ (1/2, 1), λ is a rational number
in (0, q), and τ ∈ (0, 1).
A voting schema S = (m, v, q, λ, τ ) implicitly defines the set of players
{A0, A1, . . . , Am}. The player A0 is the primary player while all the other players
are secondary players. The value vi is the a priori weight of player Ai . A number of
voting games can arise from S by specifying the set of players to be N = {A0} ∪ V
where V is a subset of {A1, . . . , Am} satisfying #V ≥ τm.We consider τ to be a voting
quorum, i.e., a minimum of τm secondary players must participate in the voting for
the voting to be considered valid. Let #V = n. This gives rise to a weighted majority
voting game G consisting of the (n + 1) players in N . The winning threshold in G is
given by q. Suppose the sum of the voting weights of all the (n + 1) players in G is
ω. The voting weight of the primary player A0 is a fraction λ of ω and the combined
voting weights of all the secondary players is a fraction 1−λ of ω. Further, the voting
weights of the secondary players in G are proportional to the corresponding entries of
the players in the vector v.
3.1 Determining voting weights
Consider a voting schema S = (m, v, q, λ, τ ). Suppose a game G is formed with the
player set N = {A0}∪V where V = {A j1, . . . , A jn } ⊆ {A1, . . . , Am} and #V ≥ τm.
For i = 1, . . . , n, let ui = v ji . In G, the primary player A0 is to have a λ fraction
of the total voting weight. The requirement is to distribute the other 1 − λ fraction
of the total voting weight to the secondary players in V in proportion to the a priori
weights u1, . . . , un . A technique is required to come up with weights w0, w1, . . . , wn
such thatw0 is the weight of the primary player andw1, . . . , wn are the weights of the
secondary players satisfying the required conditions. The following result provides
such a technique.
Theorem 1 Let u1, . . . , un be positive integers and λ = a/b ∈ (0, 1) where a and b
are positive integers. Let
w0 = ua
d
, wi = ui (b − a)
d
i = 1, . . . , n; (3)
where u = u1 + · · · + un and d = gcd(ua, u1(b − a), . . . , un(b − a)). Then





= (1 − λ)ui
u
. (4)
where ω = w0 + w1 + · · · + wn.
Further, if w′0, w′1, . . . , w′n are integer values such that w′0/ω′ = λ and w′i/ω′ =
(1 − λ)ui/u for i = 1, . . . , n, where ω′ = w′0 + w′1 + · · · + w′n, then w′j = μw j for
j = 0, . . . , n for some non-zero integer μ.
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Equation (3) provides the weights that are to be assigned to the primary player and
the secondary players. Equation (4) shows the correctness of these weights, i.e., the
primary player obtains a fraction λ of the total weight and the other 1 − λ fraction is
distributed among the secondary players in proportion to their a priori weights. The
second part of Theorem 1 shows that the weights obtained in (3) are unique up to
scaling by a non-zero integer.
Corollary 1 Let u1, . . . , un and u′1, . . . , u′n be positive integers such that u′i = νui
for some non-zero integer ν. Let w0, w1, . . . , wn be obtained from u1, . . . , un as
in (3) and w′0, w′1, . . . , w′n be obtained from u′1, . . . , u′n as in (3). Then wi = w′i for
i = 0, 1, . . . , n.
The interpretation of Corollary 1 is that scaling of the a priori weights of the secondary
players does not change the eventual weights assigned to the primary player and the
secondary players.
4 Voting games from a voting schema
We formally introduce the voting games which can arise from a voting schema.
Definition 4 Let S = (m, v, q, λ, τ ) be a voting schema, with v = (v1, . . . , vm) and
λ = a/b. This implicitly gives rise to the primary player A0 and the set of secondary
players {A1, . . . , Am}, where the a priori weight of the secondary player Ai is vi .
Let τm ≤ n ≤ m and suppose the set of secondary players V = {A j1 , . . . , A jn }
participate in the voting. Let u1 = v j1 , . . . , un = v jn and u = (u1, . . . , un). The
game Gm,n,v,V ,q,λ,τ is defined to be the weighted majority voting game on n + 1
players as follows.
Gm,n,v,V ,q,λ,τ = ({A0} ∪ V , w, q) (5)
wherew = (w0, w1, . . . , wn);w0 is the weight of A0; andw1, . . . , wn are the weights
of A j1, . . . , A jn respectively. The components of w are obtained from the components
of u as given by (3).
When the parameters m, n, v, V , q, λ and τ are understood from the context, we will
write G instead of Gm,n,v,V ,q,λ,τ .
Remarks
1. The condition q ∈ (1/2, 1) ensures that the game is proper.
2. The upper bound λ < q ensures that the primary player is not a dictator and cannot
pass a resolution by itself.
3. The primary player A0 is a blocker if and only if q > 1 − λ.
4. Consider a winning coalition consisting of the primary player and a coalition of
the secondary players whose weight is a fraction p of the total voting weights of
the secondary players. Then λ + (1 − λ)p ≥ q and so p ≥ (q − λ)/(1 − λ). If
the primary player is a blocker, i.e., q > 1−λ, then instead of Gm,n,v,V ,q,λ,τ , one
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may study the game which consists only of the secondary players (leaving out the
primary player) with the winning threshold being (q −λ)/(1−λ). This approach,
however, does not reduce any of the complexity of the original set-up. The values
of q and λ still need to be specified and the technique for determining the voting
weights of the secondary players is still required. On the contrary, this approach
loses generality in a priori requiring the primary player to be a blocker.
The primary player has a special status. The requirement that the weight of the
primary player should bemore than that of any of the secondary players is characterised
in the following result.
Proposition 1 Consider a gameGm,n,v,V ,q,λ,τ with V = {A j1 , . . . , A jn } andui = v ji ,
i = 1, . . . , n. The secondary player A ji has voting weight less than that of the primary
player A0, i.e., wi < w0 if and only if
ui
u1 + · · · + un <
λ
1 − λ.
Suppose λ = 1/3 and u1 = · · · = un . From Proposition 1, a secondary player has
voting weight less than the primary player if and only if n > 2. So, apart from the
primary player, if there are at most two secondary players in the game, then the voting
weights of the secondary players will be greater than that of the primary player. The
threshold of voting quorum τ can be used to ensure that a certain minimum number
of secondary players are present in the game which would rule out such anomalies.
Proposition 2 Suppose a game Gm,n,v,V ,q,λ,τ is (α, β)-efficient with respect to the
primary player. Then α < β if and only if q ≤ (λ + 1)/2.
4.1 Uniform games
Of special interest is the case when the a priori weights of all the secondary players
are equal.
Definition 5 A voting schema S = (m, v, q, λ, τ ) is said to be uniform if v1 = · · · =
vm . A voting game Gm,n,v,V ,q,λ,τ arising from a uniform voting schema will also be
called uniform.
In view of Corollary 1, in a uniform game we may take v1 = · · · = vm = 1 and
consequently from (3), w1 = · · · = wn = (b − a)/d where λ = a/b and d =
gcd(na, (b − a)).
The importance of such games arises from the following result.
Theorem 2 Let v = (v1, . . . , vm) = (1, . . . , 1) and v′ = (v′1, . . . , v′m) where not all
the v′i ’s are equal. Suppose a game Gm,n,v,V ,q,λ,τ is (α, β)-efficient with respect to
the primary player and a game G ′m,n,v′,V ,q,λ,τ is (α
′, β ′)-efficient with respect to the
primary player. Then α ≥ α′ and β ≥ β ′.
In other words, we have the following. Let Gm,n,v,V ,q,λ,τ be a game which is (α, β)-
efficient with respect to the primary player. Theorem 2 shows that if Gm,n,v,V ,q,λ,τ is
uniform, then α and β take the maximum possible values.
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We next consider the possible values of α and β in a uniform game which is (α, β)-
efficient with respect to the primary player. One may wish to increase the values of
both α and β by appropriately setting the values of λ and q. The next result shows that
this is not possible.
Theorem 3 A uniform game Gm,n,v,V ,q,λ,τ is (p, q)-efficient with respect to the pri-






p + q = n + 1.
There are several consequences of Theorem 3.
1. For fixed q and λ, both p and q decrease with decreasing n. So, as the number
of secondary players which participate in voting goes down, the primary player
requires lesser number of secondary players to win and also a lesser number of
secondary players can form a blocking coalition.
2. For fixed q and n, as λ increases, the value of ρ increases in unit steps from n(1−q)
to 2n(1 − q) − 1.
Combining Theorems 2 and 3 , we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4 Suppose a game Gm,n,v,V ,q,λ,τ (which is not necessarily uniform) is
(α, β)-efficient with respect to the primary player. Then α + β ≤ n + 1.
Suppose that q > 1 − λ so that the primary player is a blocker. In this setting, for
fixed n and q, it is of interest to determine the effect of changing λ on p and q.
Theorem 5 Let Gm,n,v,V ,q,λ1,τ be a uniform game with q > 1− λ1 which is (p1, q1)-
efficient with respect to the primary player and let Gm,n,v,V ,q,λ2,τ be a uniform game
with q > 1 − λ2 which is (p2, q2)-efficient with respect to the primary player. Then
1. λ1 ≥ λ2 if and only if p1 ≤ p2.
2. λ1 ≥ λ2 if and only if q1 ≥ q2.
5 Modified voting games from a voting schema
Suppose thatwewish to determine theminimumvalue ofλ such that the primary player
is a blocker. In the game Gm,n,v,V ,q,λ,τ , any value of λ and q such that λ > 1 − q
will ensure that the primary player is a blocker. This creates a problem. The condition
λ greater than 1 − q does not provide a unique value of λ. For any choice λ1 of λ, it
is possible to find a λ2 such that 1 − q < λ2 < λ1. So, the problem of assigning the
minimum possible weight to the primary player resulting in it being a blocker cannot
be solved.
To tackle this problem, we consider modified weighted majority voting games
whose winning condition is given by (2). We make the following definition.
Definition 6 Let S = (m, v, q, λ, τ ) be a voting schema, with v = (v1, . . . , vm),
λ = a/b andq = 1−λ. This implicitly gives rise to the primary player A0 and the set of
secondary players {A1, . . . , Am}, where the a priori weight of the secondary player Ai
is vi . Let τm ≤ n ≤ m and suppose the set of secondary players V = {A j1 , . . . , A jn }
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participate in the voting. Let u1 = v j1 , . . . , un = v jn and u = (u1, . . . , un). The
game G̃m,n,v,V ,λ,τ is defined to be amodifiedweighted majority voting game on n+1
players as follows.
G̃m,n,v,V ,λ,τ = ({A0} ∪ V , w, q) (6)
wherew = (w0, w1, . . . , wn);w0 is the weight of A0; andw1, . . . , wn are the weights
of A j1, . . . , A jn respectively. The components of w are obtained from the components
of u as given by (3).
Remarks
1. In the voting schema S = (m, v, q, λ, τ ) and a modified voting gameGm,n,v,V ,λ,τ
arising from S, the value of q is fixed to 1−λ. This ensures that the primary player
A0 is a blocker and further, has the minimum possible weight which makes it a
blocker.
2. For the game to be proper, we require q > 1/2 which combined with q = 1 − λ
implies that λ < 1/2. Since q > 1/2 and λ < 1/2, it follows that λ < q and so
the primary player is not a dictator.
We observe that Proposition 1 characterises the condition that the secondary players
have voting weights less than that of the primary player. This result does not require
the winning condition. So, Proposition 1 also holds for modified games.
Suppose S = (m, v, 1−λ, λ, τ ) is a uniform voting schema, i.e., v1 = · · · = vn . A
modified voting game G̃m,n,v,V ,λ,τ arising from S will be called a modified uniform
voting game. It is possible to derive results on modified uniform voting games which
are analogous to results on uniform voting games. These are mentioned below.
Theorem 6 Let v = (v1, . . . , vm) = (1, . . . , 1) and v′ = (v′1, . . . , v′m) where not
all the v′i ’s are equal. Suppose a modified game G̃m,n,v,V ,λ,τ is (α, β)-efficient with
respect to the primary player and a game G̃ ′m,n,v′,V ,λ is (α
′, β ′)-efficient with respect
to the primary player. Then α ≥ α′ and β ≥ β ′.
Theorem 7 A uniform modified game G̃m,n,v,V ,λ,τ is (s, t)-efficient with respect to the





. Consequently, we have
s + t = n + 1.
Combining Theorems 6 and 7 , we obtain the following result.
Theorem 8 Suppose a modified game G̃m,n,v,V ,λ,τ (which is not necessarily uniform)
is (α, β)-efficient with respect to the primary player. Then α + β ≤ n + 1.
Theorem 9 Let G̃m,n,v,V ,λ1,τ be a uniform modified game which is (s1, t1)-efficient
with respect to the primary player and let G̃m,n,v,V ,λ2,τ be a uniform modified game
which is (s2, t2)-efficient with respect to the primary player. Then
1. λ1 ≥ λ2 if and only if s1 ≤ s2.
2. λ1 ≥ λ2 if and only if t1 ≥ t2.
Proposition 3 Suppose a modified game G̃m,n,v,V ,λ,τ is (α, β)-efficient with respect
to the primary player. Then α < β if and only if λ > 1/3.
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6 Voting in the GST Council
In the last few sections, we have studied voting games arising from a voting schema.
This has been done in an abstract theoretical set-up. In the present section, we
connect the formal analysis to the actual voting procedure in the GST Council.
The present voting procedure of the GST Council is captured by a voting schema
GST = (m, v, q, λ, τ ), where
– m = 31, q = 3/4, and λ = 1/3;
– v and τ are not specified.
Choice of v Since the voting rules do not specify v, onemay consider several possibili-
ties for determining v, namely, the entries of v are equal, the entries of v are determined
by the sizes of the population of the States, and the entries of v are determined by the
GDP of the States. Whatever be the choice of v, the actual voting weights are to be
determined using Theorem 1.
Meeting quorum The GST rules specify a meeting quorum which states that for
a meeting to be considered valid more than half of the members must be present.
Our formalisation of the GST voting rules does not capture meeting quorum. This
is because, given the importance of the GST Council, it is extremely unlikely that a
meeting quorum will not be attained.
Voting quorum We have introduced the parameter τ which represents the threshold
of voting quorum. This notion of voting quorum is not part of the GST voting rules.
Since the actual voting weights depend on the States which take part in the voting, the
notion of voting quorum becomes important in ensuring that the States have voting
weights less than that of the Centre (see Proposition 1).
In a federal set-up, there should be checks on the power of the Centre. In the context
of the GST Council, these checks come in two forms. On the one hand, the Centre
should not be able to pass a resolution with the support of only a small number of
States, while, on the other hand, blocking a resolution moved by the Centre should
not require a large number of States to form a coalition. With respect to these checks,
Theorems 2, 3 and 4 uncover a dichotomous situation. If the a priori weights are made
equal, then the Centre’s task of mustering a winning coalition becomes more difficult
and the task of forming a blocking coalition by the States also becomes more difficult.
Conversely, if unequal a priori weights are used, then the States’ task of forming a
blocking coalition becomes easier and the Centre’s task of forming a winning coalition
also becomes easier.
Theorem 5 shows that as the fraction of the Centre’s weight increases, the Centre
requires lesser number of partners to pass a resolution while a greater number of States
must come together to block a resolution. Consequently, providing more weight to the
Centre decreases its dependence on the States and so works against the principle of
decentralisation.
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6.1 GST voting desiderata
We list down a set of basic desiderata and their rationale that a voting procedure in the
GST Council should satisfy.
Desideratum 1: The Centre should be a blocker. The Centre enjoys the confidence
of the Lok Sabha which is the apex legislative body in the country. So, any resolution
that is passed should have the approval of the Centre and by implication the approval
of the Lok Sabha.
Desideratum 2: The Centre’s weight should be enough to ensure it is a blocker
and no more. While the Centre should certainly be a blocker, we do not find any
socio-political justification to assign more weight to the Centre beyond the minimum
necessary to ensure that it is a blocker.
Desideratum 3: The weight of any State should be less than that of the Centre.
While any State represents only a segment of the population, the Centre represents
the whole population. In view of this, it is reasonable to require that the Centre has
weight more than any of the States. Note that Desiderata 2 and 3 together imply that
no State is a blocker.2
Desideratum 4: The game should be (α, β)-efficient with respect to the Centre
where α ≥ β. This condition will ensure that the Centre will require at least as
many States to pass a resolution as the minimum number of States who need to
come together to block a resolution. In other words, the Centre’s job of mustering a
supporting coalition should not be any easier than the possible role of a coalition of
States to block a resolution.
Desiderata and the present GST rules Since the Centre is a blocker, Desideratum 1 is
satisfied by the present GST rules. On the other hand, as discussed at the start of Sect. 5,
it is not possible to satisfy Desideratum 2 when the winning condition is “≥”. Since
the winning condition in the GST rules is indeed of the type “≥”, Desideratum 2 is not
satisfied by the present GST rules. A characterisation of the condition that the weight
of any State is less than that of the Centre is given by Proposition 1. This condition
cannot be ensured without specifying a threshold of voting quorum. The present GST
rules do not mention voting quorum and so, Desideratum 3 is not ensured to hold.
Since the GST Act specifies λ = 1/3 and q = 3/4, from Proposition 2 the condition
α ≥ β holds and so Desideratum 4 holds for the present GST rules.
Suggestions for modifying voting rules in the GST Council To satisfy Desiderata 1
and 2, we suggest that a voting schema with q = 1 − λ and modified voting game be
adopted. To ensure Desideratum 3, it is required to choose an appropriate value for
the voting quorum parameter τ . Suppose λ = 1/4. Using Proposition 1, if the a priori
voting weights are equal, then Desideratum 3 holds if and only if at least four States
participate in the voting; this is ensured by setting τ = 1/10. For modified voting
games, Proposition 3 states that the condition α ≥ β is ensured by choosing λ ≤ 1/3.
2 In a previous version, we had a separate desideratum which postulated that no State should be a blocker.
We thank Sascha Kurz for kindly pointing out that Desiderata 2 and 3 together imply such a postulate.
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So, to satisfy Desideratum 4, it is sufficient to choose a value of λ which is at most
1/3.
RemarkThe presentGST rules permit the possibility of strategic voting, either by being
absent, or, by being present but, abstaining. This may not be desirable. Nonetheless,
this feature may also not be avoidable. The members of the GST Council are elected
representatives. It is perhaps difficult to pass a law whereby elected representatives
are forced to be present in a meeting and to take part in the voting. The desiderata that
we have formulated do not address the issue of strategic voting. Preventing strategic
voting will require a much more drastic change to the GST voting rule than what we
have proposed. We leave it to future work to come up with such a change of rules and
associated socio-political justifications.
7 Conclusion
This work carried out an in-depth theoretical analysis of the voting rule specified in the
GST Act. The analysis has been done using the formal framework of voting games.
We have identified a set of desiderata and put forward suggestions for modifying the
voting rule in the GST Act.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1 Note thatω = w0+w1+· · ·+wn = ub/d and sow0/ω = a/b =
λ and wi/ω = ui (b − a)/(ub) = (1 − a/b)ui/u = (1 − λ)ui/u. This shows that
w0, w1, . . . , wn determined by (3) satisfy (4).
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The following computation shows the second part of the result.















λ : (1 − λ)u1
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: (b − a)u1
bu
: · · · : (b − a)un
bu
]





: (b − a)u1
d
: · · · : (b − a)un
d
]
= [w0 : w1 : · · · : wn].

Proof of Proposition 1 From (3), we have wi < w0 if and only if ui/u < a/(b − a)
where u = u1 + · · · + un . Using λ = a/b we obtain the required result. 
Proof of Proposition 2 By the definition, λ < q and so the primary player is not a
dictator and consequently, it can be argued that α, β > 0.
Let the weight of the primary player be w0 and that of the n secondary players be
w1, . . . , wn where we assume without loss of generality that w1 ≥ w2 ≥ · · · ≥ wn .
Let ω = w0 + w1 + · · · + wn . Note that w0/ω = λ. Since G is (α, β)-efficient
with respect to the primary player, it follows that a minimum size winning coalition
contains α secondary players and a minimum size blocking coalition consisting only
of secondary players has β players. Using the order condition on the wi ’s, we have
w0 + w1 + · · · + wα ≥ qω and w1 + · · · + wβ > (1− q)ω. Now α < β if and only if
a coalition of α secondary players do not form a blocking coalition. The last condition
holds if and only if the sum of the first α weights is at most (1− q)ω, i.e., if and only
if w1 + · · · + wα ≤ (1 − q)ω. Combining this with w0 + w1 + · · · + wα ≥ qω, we
have qω − w0 ≤ w1 + · · · + wα ≤ (1 − q)ω. So, qω − w0 ≤ (1 − q)ω which is
equivalent to 2q − 1 ≤ w0/ω = λ. Rearranging, we obtain the desired inequality. 
Proof of Theorem 2 Let Gm,n,v,V ,q,λ,τ be a uniform game where the ui ’s are all equal.
The weight w0 of the primary player and the weights w1, . . . , wn of the n secondary
players which participate in the voting are obtained from (3). Since the ui ’s are equal,
so are the wi ’s. Let ω = w0 + w1 + · · · + wn . So, w0 = λω and wi = (1− λ)ω/n for
i = 1, . . . , n.
Now consider a game G ′m,n,v′,V ,q,λ,τ where the a priori weights v
′
i of the secondary
players are not equal. The weights in the voting game are again obtained from (3). In
G ′, let the weight of the primary player bew′0 and the weights of the secondary players
be w′1, . . . , w′n . Without loss of generality, we assume that w′1 ≥ w′2 ≥ · · · ≥ w′n . Let
ω′ = w′0 + w′1 + · · · + w′n . So, w′0 = λω′ and w′1 + · · · + w′n = (1 − λ)ω′.
Claim 1 The minimum of the sizes of the minimal winning coalitions in G ′ is at most
the minimum of the sizes of the minimal winning coalitions in G.
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Proof of Claim 1 Suppose G has a winning coalition consisting of the primary player
and k of the secondary players. Then
λω + kω(1 − λ)/n
ω
= λ + k(1 − λ)
n
≥ q. (7)
In G ′, consider the coalition S consisting of the primary player and the secondary





0 + w′1 + · · · + w′k
ω′
= λ + (1 − λ)w
′
1 + · · · + w′k
w′1 + · · · + w′n
. (8)
From w′1 ≥ w′2 ≥ · · · ≥ w′n , we have
(n − k)(w′1 + · · · + w′k) ≥ (n − k)kw′k ≥ k(n − k)w′k+1 ≥ k(w′k+1 + · · · + w′1).
Adding k(w′1+· · ·+w′k) to both sides, we have n(w′1+· · ·+w′k) ≥ k(w′1+· · ·+w′n)
and consequently
w′1 + · · · + w′k




Combining (8) with (7) and (9) we obtain
wS
ω′
= λ + (1 − λ)w
′
1 + · · · + w′k
w′1 + · · · + w′n
≥ λ + k(1 − λ)
n
≥ q.
This shows that if there is awinning coalition of size k inG, then there is also awinning
coalition of size k inG ′. So, theminimumof the sizes of theminimalwinning coalitions
in G ′ is at most the minimum of the sizes of the minimal winning coalitions in G. This
establishes Claim 1.
Claim 2 The minimum of the sizes of the minimal blocking coalitions not containing
the primary player in G ′ is at most the minimum of the sizes of the minimal blocking
coalitions not containing the primary player in G.




= (1 − λ)
n
> 1 − q. (10)
In G ′, consider the coalition T consisting of the secondary players having the weights





1 + · · · + w′
ω′
= (1 − λ)w
′
1 + · · · + w′
w′1 + · · · + w′n
. (11)
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As in the proof of Claim 1, it can be shown that
w′1 + · · · + w′
w′1 + · · · + w′n
≥ 
n
, and so from (11)
and (10), we obtain
wT
ω′
≥ λ+ (1 − λ)
n
> 1−q.This shows that if there is a blocking
coalition not containing the primary player of size  in G, then there is a blocking
coalition not containing the primary player of size  in G ′. So, the minimum of the
sizes of the minimal blocking coalitions not containing the primary player in G ′ is at
most the minimum of the sizes of the minimal blocking coalitions not containing the
primary player in G. This establishes Claim 2.
From Claims 1 and 2, it follows that if G is (α, β)-efficient with respect to the
primary player, then G ′ is (α′, β ′)-efficient with respect to the primary player where
α′ ≤ α and β ′ ≤ β. 
Proof of Theorem 3 Let λ = a/b. Since all the a priori weights are equal, from (3) we
have u = n, w0 = an/d and wi = (b − a)/d for i = 1, . . . , n and so ω = bu/d =
bn/d. Suppose the primary player and k other secondary players form a coalition.







⇔ k ≥ n(qb − a)
b − a = n
q − λ
1 − λ = n
(1 − λ) − (1 − q)
1 − λ = n −
n(1 − q)
1 − λ





= n − ρ
⇔ k ≥ p.
A coalition is blocking if and only if the sum of the weights of the players in the
coalition is greater than (1 − q)ω. A coalition consisting of  secondary players has






⇔  > n(1 − q)b













= 1 + ρ
⇔  ≥ q.

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So, λ1 ≥ λ2 ⇔ ρ1 ≥ ρ2 ⇔ p1 ≤ p2. The inequality cannot be made strict since
it is possible that λ1 > λ2 but, ρ1 = ρ2.
From Theorem 3, we have q1 = 1 + ρ1 and p2 = 1 + ρ2. So, λ1 ≥ λ2 ⇔ ρ1 ≥
ρ2 ⇔ q1 ≥ q2. Again, the inequality cannot be made strict. 
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